Saudis Suggest Path
Monday’s Arab News published an editorial further elucidating the Saudi line in the present crisis. The editorial discusses the difficult situation facing Lebanon. If the Lebanese government attempts to rein in Hezbollah it risks plunging the country into a renewed civil war. But if it does not, it runs the risk of being turned into a battleground by the disruptive attacks of Israel (which the Saudis at least, unlike the Iranians, actually term “Israel”). What course should Lebanon choose?
The editorial, while acknowledging that “any effort by Fuad Siniora’s government to use force against Hezbollah could trigger another bloody civil war,” nonetheless suggests that just such a course must “start now,” arguing that “[d]isarming Hezbollah should be done gradually, through a process of national reconciliation.”
Saudi reasoning reflects a realistic appreciation of the international situation (my bolding).
The Israeli response to a Hezbollah attack on Haifa will be brutal; world reaction will surely not act as a deterrent. The UN Security Council failed to agree on a statement calling for a cease-fire in Lebanon, despite pleas from the Lebanese prime minister. President Bush will not press Israel to halt its attacks. Hezbollah, meanwhile, is firing waves of rockets ever deeper into Israel, getting closer to Tel Aviv. Neither side is showing signs of backing down from the conflict. The relationship between Hezbollah and the government is complex, but should not be confused. The government is not responsible for Hezbollah’s actions. Because Hezbollah operates outside the government’s authority, the Lebanese government should not be held responsible for the present mess. States, not parties, should take decisions about going to war. Lebanese civilians and their cities are bearing the brunt of an assault for which Siniora holds both Israel and Hezbollah responsible—the former for using a disproportionate use of deadly force to secure the release of two captured Israeli soldiers, the latter for dragging Lebanon into a conflict the government neither chose nor wanted. Should it take its fate in its own hands, the Lebanese government would be exercising the right and duty it has in extending control over all its territory.
While it is true that the Saudis are pointing fingers equally at both Hezbollah and Israel for the crisis, the action Riyadh is recommending is aimed primarily at the former. I suspect that this will be seen in Washington and Jerusalem as a signal by the Saudis that the Lebanese government must act to shut down Hezbollah, and if it does not, or cannot, the Saudis are not likely to take action in support of Hezbollah unless the Israeli offensive broadens and deepens.
As I pointed out in an earlier post, the subtext of this crisis is pitting non-national (Hamas and Hezbollah) actors against national actors (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, etc.), and the Arab states against Iran. It is this division that has allowed the Israelis, thus far, the ability to act, and allowed the United States to remain less than fully engaged.
What should we be watching? First, does the Lebanese government show signs of the will to bring its southern region under control. Second, does the Lebanese government have the power to bring Hezbollah under control? If the answer to those questions proves to be yes, then the question will be how does Syria respond? If the answer is no, then it follows that Israel will have to do the job itself.
There are far too many variables to make predictions, but one thing that can be said with certainty is that the present predicament is not your standard Arab-Israeli crisis. This one is wholly other.
