Tehran Takes the Lead
What is happening in the Middle East? First we had the attacks from Gaza against Israel by Hamas. This has now been followed by attacks from Lebanon by Hizbollah. Both groups fired rockets into Israel and in raids managed to capture several IDF soldiers, virtually forcing the Israelis to meet the demands of Hamas and Hizbollah and reward terrorism, do nothing and appear weak, or retaliate by striking at or moving into Gaza and Lebanon. While all of this has been going on, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been on a speaking tour lashing out at “the Zionist entity” and its supporters, and projecting Iran into a leadership position within the Islamic world.
The Arab front line state with the largest stake in the developing crisis is Syria. In June Syria and Iran reached a military cooperation agreement. Reports indicate that the Iranians have promised the Syrians financial support for a build-up of the Syrian military. Hizbollah, based in southern Lebanon, is a Shi’a organization supported by Tehran.
One advantage gained by the Iranians during the growing crisis is that it shifts the attention of the West away from the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program. And, of course, any Israeli retaliation will bring instant condemnation from the Islamic world and a good part of the rest. Moreover, a crisis that threatened Lebanon’s territory would weaken the reform movement their, strengthen Islamist elements, and could serve as an excuse for the reintroduction of Syrian troops.
But if this is, in fact, the Iranian game, it is a dangerous one, especially for Syria. Jordan and Egypt are unlikely to assist Damascus should the crisis escalate. Nor, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, is there a great power willing to pressure the United States to keep the Israelis on a short leash.
Perhaps the Syrians and Iranians expect the Israelis to repeat their invasion of Lebanon in 1982. While the Israelis will no doubt operate in southern Lebanon south of the Litani River, it is not inconceivable that if the crisis spins out of control they might move directly against Syria itself. The IDF has been to Beirut once already. They’ve yet to reach Damascus.
It is conceivable that a Syrian military debacle along the road from the Golan Heights to Damascus could be a death-blow to the regime of President Bashir Assad. That might well be good news for the American effort in Iraq. But, then again, the Middle East is nothing if not unpredictable.
What we do know is that when Hizbollah acts, Syria and Iran are involved. Their intentions remain a matter of speculation, but the game they are playing is risky. If they assume that Israel will be held on a short leash by the West, and especially by the United States, they may be mistaken. But Iran might be willing to risk seeing Syria humiliated in the hope that such an event would force the rest of the Arab world to react as it did in 1973, and weaken both President Mubarak in Egypt and King Abdullah in Jordan.
On key element of this evolving crisis is that the jihadist elements—Hamas and Hezbollah—have taken the lead in lieu of state actors, for example Nasser in 1956 and 1967 and Sadat in 1973. And if Hezbollah and Hamas are nothing but tools, which seems likely with regard to the former, it is Tehran and not Cairo calling the shots.
We may be witnessing the merging of jihadist (in this case non-al-Qaeda) efforts with Iranian state politics. Tehran, which is working diligently (see my post of July 10, 2006) to undermine the image of al-Qaeda, sees itself as the leader of the Islamist movement.
As bad as the situation might look, it could be worse. At least the Iranians do not have nuclear weapons, at least not yet. But imagine playing out the present crisis with a nuclear Iran.
The Arab front line state with the largest stake in the developing crisis is Syria. In June Syria and Iran reached a military cooperation agreement. Reports indicate that the Iranians have promised the Syrians financial support for a build-up of the Syrian military. Hizbollah, based in southern Lebanon, is a Shi’a organization supported by Tehran.
One advantage gained by the Iranians during the growing crisis is that it shifts the attention of the West away from the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program. And, of course, any Israeli retaliation will bring instant condemnation from the Islamic world and a good part of the rest. Moreover, a crisis that threatened Lebanon’s territory would weaken the reform movement their, strengthen Islamist elements, and could serve as an excuse for the reintroduction of Syrian troops.
But if this is, in fact, the Iranian game, it is a dangerous one, especially for Syria. Jordan and Egypt are unlikely to assist Damascus should the crisis escalate. Nor, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, is there a great power willing to pressure the United States to keep the Israelis on a short leash.
Perhaps the Syrians and Iranians expect the Israelis to repeat their invasion of Lebanon in 1982. While the Israelis will no doubt operate in southern Lebanon south of the Litani River, it is not inconceivable that if the crisis spins out of control they might move directly against Syria itself. The IDF has been to Beirut once already. They’ve yet to reach Damascus.
It is conceivable that a Syrian military debacle along the road from the Golan Heights to Damascus could be a death-blow to the regime of President Bashir Assad. That might well be good news for the American effort in Iraq. But, then again, the Middle East is nothing if not unpredictable.
What we do know is that when Hizbollah acts, Syria and Iran are involved. Their intentions remain a matter of speculation, but the game they are playing is risky. If they assume that Israel will be held on a short leash by the West, and especially by the United States, they may be mistaken. But Iran might be willing to risk seeing Syria humiliated in the hope that such an event would force the rest of the Arab world to react as it did in 1973, and weaken both President Mubarak in Egypt and King Abdullah in Jordan.
On key element of this evolving crisis is that the jihadist elements—Hamas and Hezbollah—have taken the lead in lieu of state actors, for example Nasser in 1956 and 1967 and Sadat in 1973. And if Hezbollah and Hamas are nothing but tools, which seems likely with regard to the former, it is Tehran and not Cairo calling the shots.
We may be witnessing the merging of jihadist (in this case non-al-Qaeda) efforts with Iranian state politics. Tehran, which is working diligently (see my post of July 10, 2006) to undermine the image of al-Qaeda, sees itself as the leader of the Islamist movement.
As bad as the situation might look, it could be worse. At least the Iranians do not have nuclear weapons, at least not yet. But imagine playing out the present crisis with a nuclear Iran.
